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Lithic agency, Scottish modernism, and the politics of nuclear war 
 
This paper argues that entangledness with inorganic agency, particularly that 
of stone, not only speaks to recent object-oriented and ecocritical thought, but 
also marks a constitutional division within the UK, since ‘thing power’ 
implies a scepticism over the organic authority of an uncodified British 
constitution. The agency of stone undercuts the organicism of Hanoverian 
‘natural law’ that can only understand the social as an ‘evolving’ association 
of individual property owners, demanding an ontological ‘distance’ from 
objects. Lithic agency was already of concern to 1920s-’30s Scottish 
modernists, notably Hugh MacDiarmid, but can be traced forward to anxieties 
over the ‘totalising’ or ‘time-fixing’ qualities of nuclear weapons. We describe 
this line of agential stone from modernism to the nuclear dramas of the ‘New 
Cold War’ era, and how it entails an ontological shattering of the British 
distance from objects. Depictions of the physical violence of nuclear standoff 
shatter the totalisation required by British natural law, pointing to a 
specifically Scottish and sub-British political aesthetic. An ontological 
division over nuclear weapons remains central to Scottish independence 
campaigns today – and their release of ‘stony’ and ‘dusty’ powers beyond the 
human provide a ‘concrete’ example for object-oriented thinking within 
literary theory after its geological turn. 
  
Keywords: Stone, object-oriented ontology, Scottish modernism, nuclear, 
Hugh MacDiarmid, cold war. 
 
Correlationism and British Authority 
 
An inorganic turn in cultural theory, seen in books including Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s 
Stone: An Ecology of the Inhuman (2015) and Timothy Morton’s Realist Magic: 
Objects, Ontology, Causality (2013), has sometimes described stone’s ability to 
suggest a radically different time. Lithic time has been understood, to an extent, as 
interrupting the ideas of organic community that originate in Enlightenment 
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conceptions of nature.1 This paper attempts to redirect this interest in stone in two 
ways. Firstly, if agential stone interrupts an organic understanding of the social which 
is based in the fixed or eternal primacy of human subjectivity, this has a particular 
valency for the uncodified British constitution – and, by extension, the Anglophone 
empire. Since Because the modern British tradition of British natural law, made a 
foundation of state and extended into empire through the long eighteenth century, 
understood individual property as the force of nature, the return of the inorganic 
forces, or ‘thingly power’, – meant a particular and direct threat. Secondly and 
relatedly, since inorganic agency has been constitutionally specific in this way, it has 
been picked up at sub-British levels.2 In particular, lithic entanglement was registered 
in Scottish modernism between the world wars, and then reappeared on a wider level 
after the attrition of post-war consensus in the 1970s and ’80s. In turn, an attempt to 
stabilise objects relative to individual ownership can be read in the Thatcherite 
commitment to nuclear weapons – while conversely nuclear war docudramas track 
Scottish modernism’s attitude to object entanglement. The idea that nature exists ‘for 
us’ has been a pillar of British liberalism and neoliberalism, and this became an 
underground ontological issue in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, when it 
already had this long history of lithic entanglement behind it.  
Quentin Meillasoux’s term correlationism is probably most familiarly 
associated with Kant’s preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, in which he formalises 
the relation between human and non-human natures: 
it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all 
attempts to find something about them a priori through concepts that would 
extend our cognition have […] come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether 
we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the 
objects must conform to our cognition,… which is to establish something 
about objects before they are given to us.3 
This means that, firstly, we can only think objects as they appear to us – objects 
conform to our minds – and secondly, there can be no knowledge of being-in-itself 
outside of these objects’ appearances. What exists outside of the world as-it-appears-
to-us, Kant called the noumenal, as opposed to the phenomenal – but continental 
philosophy has recently enhanced the standing of the latter. Under correlationism, 
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‘[n]ot only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp an object ‘in itself’, 
in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain 
that we can never grasp a subject that would not always-already be related to an 
object’.4 However, since the early 2000s a theme of object-oriented or speculative 
realist has been a scepticism towards Kant’s epistemological bind as described by 
Meillassoux, because ‘we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking 
and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’.5  
But despite the unusual association of correlationism with Kant, the primacy 
of the subject which stands over and regulates the noumenal as its appearance to us 
can be traced back and strongly linked to the establishment of the modern British state 
in a trajectory that runs from John Locke through David Hume to Edmund Burke. The 
philosophical underpinnings of the Hanoverian Restoration of 1688 anchored organic 
ideas of government in a powerful tradition of natural law that would increasingly 
drawing from the universal laws of Newtonian cosmology and stressing a world of 
discrete and ownable objects. Where the expansion of property ownership is a natural 
condition of the social, or for Locke ‘[t]he great and chief end… of Men’s… putting 
themselves under Governments’, can the stakes of correlationism are particularly 
high, and are become the basis of a whole lifeworld.6 Locke’s insistence on citizens’ 
relation to property demands means both that the labouring body itself must have 
already been owned, and that the property-owning individual, now the natural basis of 
social organisation, depends on the object-in-itself’s inertness and passivity.7 So if 
correlationism was important to Kant, for the modern British state it was already not 
only important, but a condition of existence. This foundational correlationism says 
much about the peculiar homeliness of the neoliberal extension of possibilities for 
property in Britain, and about what William Davies has described as an undeclared 
reliance on a ‘metaphysics’ of the individual.8  
A Lockean or Hanoverian correlationistThis tradition of natural law would be 
accepted built on and transmitted in various forms by most of the literati of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, in particular after the quelling of the Jacobite rebellions of 
the 1740s, and indeed the evolution of property forms would be made an overarching 
historiographical principle by Adam Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence (1763) and 
those by many theories of history who followedto follow.9 David Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (1748) discourages speculation about objects, 
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since ‘nature… has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of 
objects’, and that we can only have knowledge of those objective qualities which are 
made to conform to our senses.10 Ontology then is less a question of ‘being’ than of 
‘being-for-us’ – knowledge of the object can only occur in the presence of a 
corresponding subject. Although it often referencesing Kant, this ultimately is what 
was taken issue with by 2000s object-oriented ontology, not whether the object is 
knowable per se, but whether there can only be knowledge of the object when a 
subject is present. The empiricism of Locke and Hume – or, Hanoverian empiricism – 
is firmly rooted to human perception – so ‘[o]ur senses inform us of the colour, 
weight, and consistency of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of 
those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of the human body’.11 
Distant nature is only palatable in so much as it resembles our insides – and the whole 
world becomes food for thought.  
By the time of Edmund Burke’s 1790 critique of revolutionary action, nature 
has become the organic continuity of habits and impressions experienced by a 
transcendental subject – and a Gothic imagery of humans’ (and Humeans’) coming 
face to face with an inorganic agency will put this continuity into crisis. Nature is 
now, in a specifically British sense, understood as the reduction of objects to a 
relationship of possession, and 
[b]y a constitutional policy, working after the pattern of nature, we receive, we 
hold, we transmit our government and our privileges in the same manner in 
which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives… Our political system 
is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world 
and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of 
transitory parts...12 
But if the correlationist relationship to property in this long eighteenth century 
trajectory had been working towards an ethics of imperial expansion, this would be 
shaken by the catastrophic failure of the trading empires arising from this expansion 
of trading empiresfrom the end of the next century, and made concrete in World War 
One. Scottish modernist writers especially in particular show tendencies that resonate 
with later object-oriented thinking’s attempts to overcome correlationism, and with 
the inorganic stresses of continental philosophy. Levi Bryant captures the urgency of 
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this turn when he argues that ‘the broader strategic import of the concept of [object-
oriented] ontology is to diminish the obsessive focus on the human, subjective and the 
cultural within social, political, cultural theory and philosophy’.13 A recent ‘lithic 
turn’ can be seen relative to a much longer refusal of the subject-object or human-
nature relation that was foundational to British capitalism (or Britain-as-capitalism). 
As in Jane Bennett’s catalogue of materialist philosophers (Democritus, Epicurus, 
Spinoza, Diderot and Deleuze) who attempted to ‘think’ the agency or ‘thingly 
power’ of the object before it becomes an Other-opposite-me, we suggest that there is 
a politico-aesthetic refusal of British ‘constitutional nature’ in some Scottish 
modernism, which in turn looks forward to the urgency of ‘object entanglement’ in 
depictions of nuclear war.14 The ‘object-oriented’ turn at the turn of the twenty-first 
century is, in that sense, a re-turn to the modernist fissure with Burkean nature from 
the early twentieth – where an entanglement with the inorganic is ‘felt’ at once as a 
constitutional rupture with British natural law and a wider ontological rupture. 
The Fissure: Scottish Modernism 
Scotland has long been a sticky area for British natural law. If in the eighteenth 
century urban Scottish ideas were crucial to extending the property-owning subject 
through empire, there would later be a strong swing away from these correlationist 
demands – understood, especially after World War One, as nationally specific. By the 
start of the nineteenth century, an Edinburgh geology boom spurred by James Hutton 
and his followers had struggled to square a world made for humans with chronologies 
beyond human measure – today understood more generically as deep time – and the 
conclusion that ‘with respect to human observation, this world has neither a beginning 
nor an end’.15 As Stephen Jay Gould has glossed the Edinburgh geology boom, ‘[b]y 
recognizing the igneous character of many rocks previously viewed as sediments 
(product of decay), Hutton incorporated a concept of repair into geological history. If 
uplift can restore an eroded topography, then geological processes set no limit upon 
time’.16 Human understandings of continuity and stasis, that is, become inadequate to 
earthly processes, and there appears the spectre of, as Jussi Parikka puts it, ‘a radical 
immensity of time… imagining possible pasts and futures without humans’.17  This 
was, as Jeremy Davies says, ‘not an arena in which stable natural processes endlessly 
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reproduce themselves, but a field of action dense with contingent successes and 
catastrophes’.18  
There are hints of such a temporality’s influence on the contemporary literary 
imagination, Hutton’s sometime Edinburgh contemporary Robert Burns for example 
turning to geological change to imagine the beyond of human intention – ‘Till a’ the 
seas gang dry, my dear / And rocks melt in the sun’.19 (And Gould describes the 
appearance of homo sapiens ‘a few moments before Auld Land Syne’).20 Deep time 
imagery remains important for twenty-first century energy politics – Timothy 
Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy for example, which opens with a long description of 
the ungraspable timescales involved in compressing organic life and rock together as 
oil.21 
It is this later scepticism that would point forward to Scottish modernism’s 
turn away from Hanoverian correlationism and towards an imagery of agential stone. 
Something of this Scottish modernist lithic turn was recognised by Cairns Craig’s 
mid-’90s description of the stony interests of the Scottish Renaissance (roughly from 
1926 to 1935) as attempting to tackle Scotland’s ‘entry into history’ after World War 
One.22 In Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s A Scots Quair (1932-34), the human ‘history’ that 
takes Chris’s husband into the war is dwarfed by the stone war monument and the 
ancient standing stones to which Chris keeps returning for temporal perspective.23 
Later in the trilogy Chris’s son’s communist commitment is ‘likened to grey granite 
itself’, and Aberdeenshire granite, ‘alive’ with radioactivity, would give the last novel 
of the trilogy its title.24 Elements of this lithoscape are anticipated by Nan Shepherd’s 
Grampian novels (1928-33), made into a quartet by the later addition of The Living 
Mountain, an ecological paean to the mountain as an organic, inorganic, and 
atmospheric body, whose opening might almost be paraphrasing Hutton’s description 
of active granite – ‘[t]he Cairngorm Mountains are a mass of granite thrust up through 
the schists and gneiss that form the lower surrounding hills’ – and which closes ‘[t]o 
know Being, this is the final grace accorded from the mountain.25 For Craig, the 
narrative use of mountain perspectives particularly suggest an intervention into 
Scotland’s ‘problem of a suspended history’, and he cites examples from A Scots 
Quair to Alasdair Gray’s Lanark (1981) that gesture towards a wider inorganic 
entanglement, or lithic yearning.26  
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Yet surely the most iconic example of this lithic yearning is Hugh 
MacDiarmid’s poem ‘On a Raised Beach’, from his 1934 book Stony Limits (a phrase 
repeated apparently unwittingly by Cohen’s Stone (2015), in which a failure to 
perceive the ‘openness and indeterminacy’ of life in granite represents a ‘stony 
limit’).27 Stony Limits has sometimes been seen as marking the point at which a 
MacDiarmid in poor nervous health, and disspirited at an early lack of mainstream 
success, sought solace in the bleaker environment of Shetland (and indeed around this 
point he rehabilitated at the Perthshire psychiatric hospital called Gilgal – ‘circle of 
sacred stones’).28 The same year MacDiarmid was the dedicatee of Gibbon’s Grey 
Granite, and Louisa Gairn rightly points out a ‘geological’ terminology in Gibbon’s 
subtitles.29 ‘On a Raised Beach’ places a lone narrator on an extensive rock formation 
understood as a source of nourishment – a ‘bread from stones’ countering Hume’s 
correlationist insistence on a communion with the noumenal world.30 Stone is now 
life-creating, as in Cohen’s etymological investigation of stone as a seed – so for 
MacDiarmid ‘[a]ll is lithogenesis – or lochia [post-partum fluid]’.31  
Moreover here the organic body and the lithic body share a time – the 
inorganic no longer follows the owning subject, but is made simultaneous to it 
through touch specifically – a resolve to turn again ‘From optik to haptik and like a 
blind man run/ My fingers over you’.32 The move from optic to haptic both 
problematises the empiricist arrangement of objects in space and sets up a thematics 
of touch as present-tense action that would look forward to the 1980s-’90s ‘Second 
Renaissance’ – the blinded narrator of James Kelman’s How Late It Was, How Late 
(1994), for example, who remaps Glasgow by feeling his way across the stone 
buildings, ‘the patacake games’.33 Entanglement with the inorganic eclipses the 
developmental temporality central to correlationism, and instead embraces what may 
appear deathly –  
 
How else does any man yet participate     
    In the life of a stone, …  
Till as the stone that covers him he lies dumb 
And the stone at the mouth of his grave is not overthrown?34  
 
If these stones appear stark and cold, they are also ‘[d]eictic, fiducial’, they have an 
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indicative function and a ‘critical’ role.35 Their existence here must be mysterious – 
the question ‘[w]hat bricole piled you here, stupendous cairn?’ referring both to the 
medieval catapult and to ‘bricolage’, an assemblage without a unifying essence, or 
some non-Lockean form of ‘nature’ that incorporates the inorganic.36   
 
Moreover these stones share an objective particularity, or what MacDiarmid describes 
as a ‘haecceity’ – a term taken from the medieval philosopher Duns Scotus to suggest 
a willed object-ness in the perception of the object.37 As MacDiarmid glosses the term 
later, haecceity is non-subjective and based in ‘the individuality of elements in a 
particular context’ – or elsewhere, , ‘what [G.M. Hopkins] following Duns Scotus, 
called haeccitas, the ‘thisness’ and individuating reality of things’.38  Individuation in 
this context refers to a process of morphogenesis in the world of which human 
subjectivity is only a secondary effect – and MacDiarmid’s use of the term bears an 
uncanny resemblance to its use in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, itself 
an important touchstone for object-oriented thinkers (and whose takeup of Scotus’s 
term is probably often imagined to be unique).39 Both MacDiarmid and Deleuze and 
Guattari adapt Scotus’s term in the geological sense of intensive processes producing 
emergent properties. The haecceity is also ‘me’ – I am my intensities – and relations 
between subjects are a specific kind of relation between pre-personal processes which 
encompass partial objects, body parts, and material flows.40 Perception is being 
rethought as a property of the world rather than something humans simply ‘do’ – so 
stones’ ‘inner’ gates are ‘open wider’ than those of humans or even animals – they are 
free of the ‘fleeting deceit of development’.41 Thus the rejection of correlationism 
stated more starkly here:  
 
What happens to us  
Is irrelevant to the world’s geology  
But what happens to the world’s geology  
Is not irrelevant to us.  
We must reconcile ourselves to the stones,  
Not the stones to us.42  
 
Like the Demosthenean pebble placed in the mouths of Greek orators to overcome 
speech impediments, these agential stones force an acknowledgment of materiality – 
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or radically expose the cogito to its own objectivity.43 This counter-correlationist 
reconciliation of stone would remain important to Scottish considerations of the sub-
British national – Neal Ascherson’s Stone Voices (2002) for example, a journey 
through through ancient stone monuments and Hutton’s Edinburgh, starts with an 
epigram from ‘On a Raised Beach’, and tracks stones’ inner gates’ onto an 
understanding of the national image.44 Twentieth-century Scottish writing would 
often return to lithic agency in this sense. George Mackay Brown described the time-
haunted islands of an Orkney marked with stone circles.45 And Edwin Morgan’s 
Sonnets from Scotland recalls both MacDiarmid’s inorganic ‘national’ landmass and 
the lithoscape of nuclear war –  
 
We saw Lewis  
laid down, when there was not much but thunder  
and volcanic fires…   
Memory of men! That was to come. Great  
in their empty hunger these surroundings  
threw walls to the sky, the sorry glory  
of a rainbow. Their heels kicked flint, chalk,  
slate.46  
 
This sequence moves to a nuclear strike and the humans who become meat in a 
geological sandwich –   
 
     … running with fire in their hair,…  
Ovens of death were falling from the air.  
Lucky seemed those at the heart of the blast, who left no flesh or ash or blood 
or bone, only a shadow on dead Glasgow’s stone.47  
 
It is probably well known that Morgan’s work both acted as a conduit for a vast range 
of European modernisms, and was associated with devolution and independence 
issues, with his commissioned poem performed, for example, at the opening of the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999. Again apparently accidentally, Cohen notes that the 
Museum of Scotland – reopened in 1998 between the devolution vote and its 
enactment – narrates Scotland’s history exactly as in Morgan’s timescale in ‘Slate’, 
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beginning with geological formation, and only later incorporating human settlement.48 
And if this temporal shift does suggest a move from the subject-centring crucial to the 
unwritten British constitution, it was becoming more pronounced at the time of 
Morgan’s sequence with the totalisation, or de-materialisation, of violence particular 
to nuclear weapons.  
 
 
Nuclear War Docudramas as Lithic Narratives 
 
 
Most of the recent accounts of the cultures of 1980s nuclear terror begin from around 
NATO’s deployment of Cruise and Pershing II in western Europe in 1979 – which, as 
Daniel Cordle puts it, ‘made the possibility of nuclear war both more visible and more 
likely’.49 This dating is fine, but the importance of nuclear weapons to the British 
(military) theatre might also be described in terms of a reassertion, for an era of 
neoliberalism, of the correlationist veto on object entanglement. It would help to 
understand Thatcherism’s drive to restore the individual subjectivity defined by 
property ownership, and its determination to hold back the creeping inorganic 
temporalities increasingly visible in popular culture, and often vested in stone. Stone 
circles appear frequently in the sub-genre now sometimes called Folk Horror, 
suggesting pre-modern – pre-Hanoverian – powers, and they address a generation 
growing up after the memory of the war’s mass defence of the organic. The Changes 
(1975), based on Peter Dickinson’s Weathermonger trilogy (1968-70), imagines a 
sudden mass fear of technology that sends wandering children out to consult an 
Arthurian megalith about the balance of nature.50 Stone circles often signal time-
travel, or as Cohen puts it, they frustrate anthropocentric continuity by creating ‘a 
lived space where a present mobilizes a past’.51 In Sky (1975), a child from a far 
future seeks out Stonehenge, through which to return his own time, in which a weird 
religious ceremony commemorates the catastrophes of anthropocentrism.52 In 
Children of the Stones (1977) stone circles generate a time-slip trapping the 
protagonists.53 And in Quatermass (1979), bands of kids stream along ley lines to 
stone circles acting as a secret conduit.54 In all these popular dramas, just as in ‘On a 
Raised Beach’, stone is able to trigger another possible temporality. And against this 
threat of non-correlationist time, nuclear violence would act as a temporal 
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redisciplining, by presenting a form of violence that is continuous and, as 
neoliberalism would increasingly demand, immaterial. Or more simply, nuclear 
violence is a perpetual delay of materiality. It is the form of coercion most fitted to the 
insistence on a correlationist world.55 
Never part of any ‘physical’ war, these weapons are nevertheless constantly in 
use, working for the unearthly reconciliation of mass destruction and the neutral rule 
of law. But against this demand, depictions of nuclear war, or the aesthetics of what 
we have called Nuclear Gothic, return the spectre of uncontrolled materiality.56 
Nuclear Gothic calls the bluff of Burkean claims to neutrality, and reveals the 
politically contingent and synthetic within the organic and the eternal. Like post-1789 
Gothic fiction, Nuclear Gothic is a constitutional critique of organic authority – and 
like ‘On a Raised Beach’, it shifts agency from the human to the lithic.  
Moreover Nuclear Gothic tends to do this from a generic position that places 
an additional stress on fictionalisation that attenuates the ‘realism’ of civil defence. As 
Duncan Campbell points out in War Plan UK (1983), the emergency powers granted 
to the government during the New (post-1979) Cold War are grounded not in escape 
but in stasis – ‘[i]n Britain, the idea of civil defence has been turned on its head. The 
official policy which is more concretely styled “Home Defence”, has, as its primary 
objective, the preservation of government – if need be, against the civil population.57  
This gives nuclear civil defence an odd sense of empty defence, especially after the 
notorious Protect and Survive campaign (1980). Mick Jackson’s QED: A Guide to 
Armageddon places three couples at various distances from an airburst over St. Paul’s 
to follow civil defence guidelines to their inevitable awful fates.58 Jackson followed 
this with the extraordinarily impactful feature-length drama Threads (1984), which 
builds on research contravening Home Office figures based on the 1980 NATO 
operation Square Leg, and draws on the mix of fact, drama, and real interview in 
Peter Watkins’s The War Game (1965), kept from domestic audiences until 1985, 
‘ostensibly because it was “too shocking” to be shown on television, although there 
was clearly also a concern that it made CND’s case too well’.59 The War Game 
pointedly stretches the defence of the British organic familiar from World War Two, 
particularly Humphrey Jennings’s Fires Were Started (1943) – its firestorm in 
Rochester, for one thing, which now can’t be stopped by any emergency service.60 
Particularly in this adaptation there is a recognition that nuclear violence is neither 
realist nor simply non-fictional, but instead demands a weird kind of alternate history 
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with no equivalent in the liberal temporality of development. This docudrama form is 
not merely the time of speculative fiction, but is beyond developmental time 
altogether. As Cordle points out, the documentary-realist features of Threads are 
particularly peculiar in this sense, since the film is looking back from a time when it 
argues that no such film-making technology would exist.61  
And as well as paradoxically assuming the failure of Mutually Assured 
Destruction, civil defence is seen in the docudramas to over-rely on the world of the 
discrete individual, which drastically underestimates the interconnectedness of life 
support systems. When Tory MPs argued in 1980 that effective civil defence could 
reduce deaths to 20 million, they were still disregarding the knock-on effects of the 
failures of collective provision.62 The strategic move to Launch on Warning similarly 
attenuated the individual subject supposedly defended, since it removed judgment 
entirely. As some of these docudramas understand, the basis of the social in property-
owning individuals of course also seriously attenuates the communal desire to pull 
together that can be drawn on by films like Fires Were Started – and this 
individualism is itself undermined by the stress on interconnectedness framing QED 
and Threads (‘in an urban society everything connects. Each person’s needs are fed 
by the skills of many others. Our lives are woven together by a fabric. But the 
connections that make society strong also make it vulnerable’).63  
It is in Threads that the realism that had stood behind the anthropocentric 
narrative become obviously mutated, significantly in a script by Barry Hines whose A 
Kestrel for a Knave (1968) had been reworked as Ken Loach’s social realist classic 
Kes (1969). Threads begins with the class observations typical to of the ’60s mode of 
social realist film, as middle-class Ruth becomes pregnant by her working-class 
boyfriend Jimmy, the families meet awkwardly, Jimmy’s father’s redundancy money 
is used for a deposit for a flat, and there are hints of Jimmy’s infidelity. After the 
blast, however, these half-developed realist problems and characters do not fizzle out, 
they simply fall out of the narrative. Jimmy’s father is one of the few characters with 
an ongoing story, but he will soon die against a gravestone, recalling Chris’s 
encounter with the village monument in A Scots Quair, but others are simply no 
longer seen. Expectations of subject-centred realist narratives disappear, and stone 
reasserts itself.  
So concrete – the promise of the malleability of stone to extend the realm of 
human home that characterised the post-war consensus – does not so much crack or 
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collapse in the blast as explode. In the rubble of houses left open to the sky, it 
becomes obvious not only that protection from buildings has been overestimated, but 
also that determination may have passed back to self-assembling stone with a sense of 
inevitability – or as ‘On a Raised Beach’ had put it, ‘[t]here are plenty of ruined 
buildings but no ruined stones’.64 Within days the rubble of homes and businesses has 
re-formed into new and apparently permanent routes, which pile up and have to be 
navigated by wanderers and scuttling children, who, unlike those of post-war 
bombed-out London, will not be able to rebuild.65  When the pregnant Ruth makes her 
way outside, the timescale of civil defence (fourteen days beneath a leaning door), 
social realism, and human intention in general, no longer inhere.   
Threads then might be seen as a story of a failure of the world of things-for-
us, as the nuclear blast disperses organic and inorganic materials to become agential – 
in one form as fallout dust, radically disassembled matter, stone, earth, animals and 
plants, which will combine with the bodies of survivors. Fallout dust is Gothic matter, 
dispersing a time beyond human death throughout the spaces of continuous empty 
time, and forming what Steven Connor has described as ‘a temporal, even a 
temporised and temporising kind of matter… pure, or perhaps rather, impure, 
matter… the matrix or negative of form’.66 Or as Parikka describes, dust is:  
 
[not] quite of the ground, not quite the atmosphere… Nanoparticles are 
everywhere and form societies unseen and unheard of, yet they conglomerate 
on a scale unimaginable to human beings… Dust forms geological strata. Dust 
marks the temporality of matter, a processual materiality of piling up, 
sedimenting, and – through its own million-year process – transformations of 
solids to ephemeral and back… Dust does not stay outside us but is a narrative 
that enters us…67  
 
The agency of fallout dust indeed was a serious topic in the early ’80s in debates over 
the likelihood of a ‘nuclear winter’, a shroud of particles making life on earth 
unsustainable.68 One scientific account from 1982 suggests that fallout warps the 
timescales of existing estimations of damage:  
 
Extremely small particles with diameters of a few hundred-thousandths of an 
inch can remain suspended in the atmosphere for several years. During this 
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period the dust can be blown many times round the world by strong winds in 
the upper atmosphere.69  
 
If dust is ‘matter in the wrong place’, a world shrouded in agential fallout dust is 
matter threatening to slip out of human use altogether.70 A world-without-us, or what 
Eugene Thacker has termed, ‘a mysticism of the unhuman’, ‘can only be expressed in 
the dust of this planet’.71 Threads gives its narrative to the deep time of fallout dust – 
from the first clouds about which the wartime controller has to appear stoical although 
he knows they’re killing his wife, to the masses of irradiated crumbling bodies. As the 
story moves on over a decade, human timescales slide away and ‘population declines, 
perhaps to medieval levels’, masked figures silently hoe the dead earth, and the scene 
is described by interspersed black and white pictures of broken masonry, as at the 
silent conclusion of the 1982 QED.  
Radioactive ‘Gothic matter’ also concerns another pioneering documentary 
form in Troy Kennedy Martin’s 1985 series Edge of Darkness, a noir thriller 
complicated by various levels of facticity including public figures playing themselves 
(the left-wing Labour MP Michael Meacher and the TV presenter Sue Cook serving 
as a kind of fiction-framed authentication) and the storage of plutonium deep under 
rock in a disused coal mine referencing the energy battles of the recently ended 
miners’ strike.72 If Threads is a speculative fiction framed by factual information – 
the documentary mode precedes Jimmy and Ruth’s social-realist look out over 
Sheffield – Edge of Darkness is based in a heavy research into ‘a country moving 
remorselessly towards a nuclear state, with all that meant for the loss of civil 
liberties’, but is framed by anti-naturalism, in the supernatural presence of the 
detective’s dead daughter.73 Riding on a new ‘literariness’ coming with the move 
from the single drama (Play for Today, The Wednesday Play) to the drama series, 
Martin was able to unfold a longstanding scepticism over progressive-naturalist 
narratives to create what has been called a ‘paranoid fiction’, one able to ‘get away 
with visions that under other circumstances (e.g. documentary or current affairs) 
wouldn’t make it to the screen… [and] unravel some of the complexities of public life 
more truthfully than investigative journalism’.74  
Here gestures towards lithic time appear as soon as the young activist Emma is 
shot dead near the start of the first episode, to reappear in spectral form beside her 
father, who from near the start embodies a being-towards-death that is only confirmed 
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by his later radiation sickness (and is guided by the MacDiarmid-like motif of the 
black mountain flower that inherits life after humanity). This relation shows 
something of the generational anxiety of Kelman’s ‘ ‘My Eldest’, whose narrator 
stares towards the nuclear base at Holy Loch, jokes about sitting on a Trident 
submarine, and tries to reach his inexplicably tense son running across the stony 
beach.75  In Edge of Darkness it soon becomes clear that Emma’s non-correlationist 
political life, in a deep ecology group gesturing to the 1979 ideas of James Lovelock, 
is reorienting the story towards a geological timescale – ‘man is the enemy, [the earth] 
will destroy him’.76 The drama then is flooded with a beyond-death that frustrates 
assumptions about the ‘usefulness’ of nuclear materials and drives Craven towards his 
eventual alliance with stone. This derailing of human developmental narratives, in the 
death of the child before the parent and in a wider ‘geologising’ of experience, is set 
against two lithoscapes that have the potential to disturb timescales – the mine with its 
catastrophic plutonium half-lives and its forgotten nuclear bunker, and, confirming 
national fissures within the correlationist world, the Scottish mountains. Where for 
Burke nature had been ‘radiant’ and reflected ‘English civilization’ back onto itself, 
the world of Edge of Darkness is unreflective, dull, opaque, and ‘withdraws’ from the 
visual faculties in the way described by some object-oriented philosophers, at the 
limits between phenomena and noumena.77 
For Craven will travel north of the border in a journey that echoes Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein. At Gleneagles Craven’s CIA acquaintance Jedburgh watches 
the nuclear entrepreneur Grogan describe how plutonium will be used to colonise 
space so that ‘man will be in charge’ – but this is undermined by Jedburgh’s 
knowledge that plutonium is in the room, and punctuated by Craven’s own 
vomiting.78 Plutonium, generator of energy and Gothic matter, turns out to be difficult 
to ‘own’ – it undermines the property relation that stabilises the subject in the British 
social – it refuses to stay at a stable correlationist distance. Plutonium, as it happens, 
is one of Timothy Morton’s examples of a hyperobject – it is ‘sticky’, attaching to 
those near it, it is nonlocal, it ‘involve[s] profoundly different temporalities than the 
human-scale ones’, and despite its agency, it is ‘invisible to humans for stretches of 
time’.79 In Edge of Darkness similarly, the movement of the plutonium drives a 
narrative dissipated in time and space, whose ‘paranoia’ suggests a ‘messy’ non-
Humean causality.  
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Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth (1982) had already popularly 
described how if nuclear war and nuclear winter could threaten the existence of all 
life on earth, then nuclear violence is already eviscerating human developmental 
narratives – creating a pure continuity, or death of death, forcing us to acknowledge a 
world that has never been for human time.80 In a nuclear-themed 1984 issue of 
Diacritics, Frances Ferguson anticipates Troy Kennedy Martin’s Frankensteinian 
journey to bleak Scottish rock by describing Schell’s nuclear annihilation as sublime, 
a submission to something immeasurably great, and here paradoxically beyond 
material violence in a totalisation of correlationist natural law, ‘a world in which the 
status of objects is progressively attenuated so as to suggest that it is subjectivity 
rather than the mere fact of the existence of objects that gives things their force’.81  
Edge of Darkness is this kind of Gothic journey north into unthinkability, and 
it takes place within a geographic centre of pessimism over the representative power 
of the British state. In the much-discussed closing sequence Craven becomes the 
mountain – as the plutonium is recovered from the bottom of Loch Lednock, the 
camera turns to see him standing on the darkening mountain in a shot containing only 
him, sky, and rock. (The original script had suggested Craven becoming a tree as in 
‘Green Man’ imagery, but accompanied by thunder – etymologically tied by Cohen to 
toner, a-ston-ishment).82And crucially in this lithic becoming Craven registers not 
only an anti-correlationist point, but also, on a stage much like MacDiarmid’s, a 
constitutional point. Moreover the view that looks back down the mountain strongly 
recalls the ‘nuclear glen’ image now common in documentaries and news and tying 
together images of nuclear weapons and images of nuclear protest. The view down 
the glen, towards the nuclear facility, real or implied, was by now a visual shorthand 
both for nuclear issues and for direct action, that is, refusal of British representation – 
and indeed Emma’s ‘Gaia’ activism confirms the knit of anti-nuclear activism and 
direct action. This lithosphere is tracked by Duncan Campbell’s 1987 BBC2 
investigative journalism series Secret Society, which describes the sweeping powers 
granted in a nuclear crisis, in which an aerial shot of the walk ‘from Loch Lomond to 
Loch Long’ is backed by the folk song by Dick Gaughan that sees the weapons appear 
in ‘man-made caverns flanked the hills/ Caverns grim of concrete grey’.83 To 
contemporary viewers Craven’s becoming-stone already suggests this constitutional 
challenge – it links national action to the possibility of circumventing the 
correlationist commitment to ‘total’ violence. 
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Stony Landscapes and Constitutional Ravines 
 
This historical enmeshing of an ontological and a constitutional standoff remains 
crucial. Nuclear ontology, along with nuclear weapons, was one of the key fissures 
behind the 2014 Scottish independence referendum – though most such fundamental 
divisons were fairly successfully reduced to empirical or psephological concerns in 
the London media (fear of economic instability, rational choice in voting). We have 
suggested that the materiality of nuclear war in post-1979 culture is thematically 
bound up with a ‘stony’ consciousness that is sceptical about the totalisation or de-
materialisation of violence – but that in this it continues Scottish modernism’s lithic 
yearnings. We have also suggested that this ‘total’ violence is an avoidance of object-
entanglement, and that Nuclear Gothic docudramas in disrupt this avoidance through 
a ‘stony’ form. The national specificity of anti-nuclear action was recognised by the 
wave of small literary-political magazines growing in what seemed the darkest hour 
of democratic deficit (Cencrastus, Chapman, Radical Scotland), in which 
unilateralism is strongly linked to (pre-New Labour) campaigns for devolution and 
independence.  
Indeed since all major Westminster political parties gave up on the possibility 
of unilateral disarmament in 1983, ‘nuclear correlationism’ has been bound together 
with British-realist parliamentary representation. As recently as 1982, nuclear 
protesters were able to postpone for two years the ironically named military exercise 
Hard Rock, but as UK-level politics itself became more individualised, concentrating 
on identity politics or the equivalence of market actors, the threat of nuclear 
extinction became an odd British blindspot only widely interrogated again with 2010s 
debates over Scottish independence. Scottish independence and disarmament 
questions have remained fundamentally linked all the way through 2014, and nuclear 
weapons as the correlate of the ‘owning’ of nature, as we have suggested, are crucial 
to a British lifeworld – which helps explain the relative disinterest in making a case 
for them on the part of No campaigners.  
So although recently both ecocritical and object-oriented thought have 
recognised that the discrete subject standing over and apart from objects is 
environmentally catastrophic, what have remained less appreciated are this subject’s 
constitutional fix, and the readability of this constitutional fix in nuclear dramas.84 
 19 
The appearance of agential stone in high modernism signalled a threat to mythologies 
of anthropocentric continuity and their correlate in the British state’s idea of nature, 
an idea commensurate with, and coming to demand, nuclear terror. Since 1979 
nuclear disarmament has had markedly less support in Scotland than in the rest of the 
UK, and this is only problematically describable in terms of the country being ‘further 
left’ (or in terms of the SNP as the ‘conscience of the Labour Party’) – more 
fundamentally there is an ontological unevenness which becomes unsupportable in 
the face of correlationism under post-1979 neoliberalism.85 
In this context, the turn towards objects, either in the form of object-oriented 
ontologies (Bryant, Harman, Morton), or of ‘vital materialism’ (Bennett), or of 
‘speculative realism’ (Meillassoux) is directly appropriate to thinking about sub-
British cultures of dissent. Especially since the correlationism Meillassoux diagnoses 
as a Kantian malady has always been an existential condition for a Hanoverian 
constitution that rested ‘naturally’ on property and was able to spread capitalist 
principles of accumulation throughout the empire, this unexpectedly long history of 
lithic encounters suggests the paving of a way to a social less slavishly bound to 
ownership. 
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